Was this screenshot, PDF, saved page or evidence locker package changed after SingleShot signed it? Drop it below. It's checked right here, in your browser, and never uploaded.
A SingleShot seal is a standard CMS signature (the format inside PDF signatures and .p7s files), optionally with an
RFC 3161 timestamp. Anyone can check one with standard tools, without trusting SingleShot's own code.
The PDF carries a standard PDF signature. Adobe Acrobat and Reader show it in the Signatures panel, and pdfsig file.pdf (poppler) checks it.
With SingleShot's own key, Acrobat reports the signer's identity as unknown: the key was made on the signing computer, not issued by an authority Acrobat trusts.
Files signed with an organisation's certificate show the signer's name.
Download seal-tools.py (Python 3; Pillow for PNG files). It writes out the signature and exactly the bytes that were signed. Then:
python3 seal-tools.py extract file.png out
# 1. the file is unchanged, and the signature was made by the certificate's key
openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in out/seal.p7s -binary \
-content out/signed-content.bin -noverify -out /dev/null
# 2. who signed, and everything that was signed (also in out/info.json)
openssl cms -cmsout -print -inform DER -in out/seal.p7s
# 3. the independent timestamp, if the seal has one
openssl ts -verify -in out/timestamp.tst -token_in \
-data out/signature-value.bin -CApath /etc/ssl/certs
To check an organisation certificate's chain too, replace -noverify with -CAfile organisation-root.pem.
Whether a certificate was revoked is not checked by this page; Acrobat and OpenSSL can check it online.
A package needs no SingleShot tool at all. Unpack it; it holds the captured files, manifest.json, SHA256SUMS.txt and a signature over that list:
# 1. every file in the package is the one that was sealed
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS.txt
# 2. the list itself is as it was signed
openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in SHA256SUMS.txt.p7s -binary \
-content SHA256SUMS.txt -noverify -out /dev/null
Each captured file in the package also carries its own seal, checked as above. manifest.json names the package sealed before this one
and that ZIP file's SHA-256: compare it with sha256sum of the earlier package to see that none was removed or swapped in between.
| File | Signed content | Where the seal is |
|---|---|---|
| JPEG, HTML, MHTML | The file's bytes before the seal | At the very end: <!--SingleShot-Seal:1:…-->, after the end of the picture or page, where browsers stop reading |
| PNG | The pixels: SHA-256 of each 256-row band of RGBA values (the lowest bit of R, G, B in the seal strip set to 0); the signed content is those band hashes, one after another | Hidden in the lowest bits of the seal strip under the picture (a change of at most 1 in 255: invisible) |
The whole file except the signature's own /Contents | A standard, invisible PDF signature field | |
| Locker package (ZIP) | SHA256SUMS.txt: the SHA-256 of the manifest and of every captured file | SHA256SUMS.txt.p7s, beside it in the ZIP |
Because a PNG's seal is over its pixels, a lossless re-save still checks out. Resizing, cropping, converting, or posting on social networks and chat apps (which re-encode pictures) removes the seal: keep the original file.
That the file is unchanged since it was signed, which key or certificate signed it, and when: by the signing computer's clock or, with an independent timestamp, vouched for by a public timestamp service so it can't be backdated. It does not prove what a website showed: a page can be changed in the browser before it's captured. Edits made in SingleShot's editor (crop, blur, redaction…) are recorded in the seal.