Check a signed file

Was this screenshot, PDF, saved page or evidence locker package changed after SingleShot signed it? Drop it below. It's checked right here, in your browser, and never uploaded.

Checking without SingleShot

A SingleShot seal is a standard CMS signature (the format inside PDF signatures and .p7s files), optionally with an RFC 3161 timestamp. Anyone can check one with standard tools, without trusting SingleShot's own code.

PDF

The PDF carries a standard PDF signature. Adobe Acrobat and Reader show it in the Signatures panel, and pdfsig file.pdf (poppler) checks it. With SingleShot's own key, Acrobat reports the signer's identity as unknown: the key was made on the signing computer, not issued by an authority Acrobat trusts. Files signed with an organisation's certificate show the signer's name.

PNG, JPEG, HTML, MHTML

Download seal-tools.py (Python 3; Pillow for PNG files). It writes out the signature and exactly the bytes that were signed. Then:

python3 seal-tools.py extract file.png out

# 1. the file is unchanged, and the signature was made by the certificate's key
openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in out/seal.p7s -binary \
    -content out/signed-content.bin -noverify -out /dev/null

# 2. who signed, and everything that was signed (also in out/info.json)
openssl cms -cmsout -print -inform DER -in out/seal.p7s

# 3. the independent timestamp, if the seal has one
openssl ts -verify -in out/timestamp.tst -token_in \
    -data out/signature-value.bin -CApath /etc/ssl/certs

To check an organisation certificate's chain too, replace -noverify with -CAfile organisation-root.pem. Whether a certificate was revoked is not checked by this page; Acrobat and OpenSSL can check it online.

Evidence locker packages (ZIP)

A package needs no SingleShot tool at all. Unpack it; it holds the captured files, manifest.json, SHA256SUMS.txt and a signature over that list:

# 1. every file in the package is the one that was sealed
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS.txt

# 2. the list itself is as it was signed
openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in SHA256SUMS.txt.p7s -binary \
    -content SHA256SUMS.txt -noverify -out /dev/null

Each captured file in the package also carries its own seal, checked as above. manifest.json names the package sealed before this one and that ZIP file's SHA-256: compare it with sha256sum of the earlier package to see that none was removed or swapped in between.

What exactly is signed

FileSigned contentWhere the seal is
JPEG, HTML, MHTMLThe file's bytes before the sealAt the very end: <!--SingleShot-Seal:1:…-->, after the end of the picture or page, where browsers stop reading
PNGThe pixels: SHA-256 of each 256-row band of RGBA values (the lowest bit of R, G, B in the seal strip set to 0); the signed content is those band hashes, one after anotherHidden in the lowest bits of the seal strip under the picture (a change of at most 1 in 255: invisible)
PDFThe whole file except the signature's own /ContentsA standard, invisible PDF signature field
Locker package (ZIP)SHA256SUMS.txt: the SHA-256 of the manifest and of every captured fileSHA256SUMS.txt.p7s, beside it in the ZIP

Because a PNG's seal is over its pixels, a lossless re-save still checks out. Resizing, cropping, converting, or posting on social networks and chat apps (which re-encode pictures) removes the seal: keep the original file.

What a signature proves

That the file is unchanged since it was signed, which key or certificate signed it, and when: by the signing computer's clock or, with an independent timestamp, vouched for by a public timestamp service so it can't be backdated. It does not prove what a website showed: a page can be changed in the browser before it's captured. Edits made in SingleShot's editor (crop, blur, redaction…) are recorded in the seal.